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Kelly had 'no right' to anonymity
The secret Downing Street memo
Memo: Bush manipulated Iraq intel
Bush asked to explain UK war memo
Indignation Grows in U.S. Over British Prewar Documents
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Kelly had 'no right' to anonymity
From stock@stokkie.net Fri Sep 26 02:14:43 2003 +0200 Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2003 02:14:43 +0200 (CEST) From: stock@stokkie.net X-X-Sender: stock@dellie.hardebol.com To: editor@mediaguardian.co.uk, <hutton.inquiry@dca.gsi.gov.uk> Subject: "Dr. Kelly had 'no right' to anonymity" Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0309260146090.8537-100000@dellie.hardebol.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO X-Status: X-Keywords: "Dr. Kelly had 'no right' to anonymity" [1] --------------------------------------- Jonathan Sumption QC for the government told Lord Hutton that David Kelly had "no right" to expect the government to keep his identity secret and Whitehall no "constitutional" duty to conceal the name of a civil servant. Briljant. From the dossier in question [2], which mentions the 45 minute claim : " FOREWORD BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE TONY BLAIR MP The document published today is based, in large part, on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC is at the heart of the British intelligence machinery. It is chaired by the Cabinet Office and made up of the heads of the UK s three Intelligence and Security Agencies, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, and senior officials from key government departments. For over 60 years the JIC has provided regular assessments to successive Prime Ministers and senior colleagues on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues. Its work, like the material it analyses, is largely secret. It is unprecedented for the Government to publish this kind of document. But in light of the debate about Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), I wanted to share with the British public the reasons why I believe this issue to be a current and serious threat to the UK national interest. " And in Chapter 3, page 17 of this Document [2] it reads : " THE CURRENT POSITION: 1998 2002 1. This chapter sets out what we know of Saddam Hussein s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence. While it takes account of the results from UN inspections and other publicly available information, it also draws heavily on the latest intelligence about Iraqi efforts to develop their programmes and capabilities since 1998. The main conclusions are that: " and then a summation of points is added, where here i quote the most notorious one : " Iraq's military forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so; " I would here suggest to Lord Hutton to ask Mr. Jonathan Sumption QC for Downing street 10, to reveal the names of the "Well Known Source" who received the above information about the 45 minutes claim. As Mr. Sumption SQ already claimed, Dr. Kelly had 'no right' to anonymity in this case, i'm most certain that the "Well Known Source" surely has neither. If Mr. Jonathan Sumption QC refuses to agree on this request, i would say that the current Ministry on Downing street 10 should be sent home. Regards, Robert -- Robert M. Stockmann - RHCE Network Engineer - UNIX/Linux Specialist crashrecovery.org stock@stokkie.net
[1] Kelly had 'no right' to anonymity
[2] IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,
[3] Campbell, that dodgy dossier and the lies that cost David Kelly his life
[4] The Strange Death of David Kelly
The secret Downing Street memoThe Sunday Times - Britain May 01, 2005 (copied from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607_1,00.html) 
The secret Downing Street memo
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson,
John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan,
Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made.
It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its
contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment.
Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to
overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was
worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was
not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime
expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that
regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public
was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible
shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush
wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the
conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were
being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN
route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's
record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath
after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August,
Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72
hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead
time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to
Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000),
continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total
lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier.
A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego
Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf
states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for
UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a
discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two
Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of
activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken,
but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action
to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US
Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this
week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military
action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin.
Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was
less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan
for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors.
This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a
legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases:
self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The
first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR
1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of
course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically
and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime
change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was
producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with
Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would
support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military
plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the
military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan
was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day
one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You
said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added
the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military
plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and
UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be
US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly
the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in
only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK
military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned
that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum
route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the
political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any
military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning
before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US
military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds
could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed
military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the
week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background
on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to
Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of
countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member
states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence
update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would
consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
Major Players:the officials present at the secret meetingBelow is a breakdown of the various individuals mentioned in the memo - all of whom were present during the meeting with the Prime Minister and subsequently received copies of these minutes.
(We will be posting a revised version of this list with descriptions of the various roles and their US equivalents soon.) Though it is sometimes difficult to equate a given official to his or her US counterpart, it's clear that this was a meeting at the highest level within the UK government. Attendees included three members of the Cabinet (Prime Minister Blair, the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary), the nation's most senior bureaucrat (the Cabinet Secretary), three out of the four top people from the UK intelligence community (the JIC Chair and the heads of MI6 and GCHQ), the head of the armed forces and four of the innermost circle of the PM's political advisors. Note: The relatively junior level of Rycroft bears no relevance to the contents of the minutes, which summarize what the principals said at the meeting to each other.
From stock@stokkie.net Tue Jun 14 03:35:06 2005 +0200
Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2005 03:35:06 +0200 (CEST)
From: "Robert M. Stockmann" <stock@stokkie.net>
To: journal@c-span.org, <letters@washpost.com>, <letters@nytimes.com>,
<letters@latimes.com>, <editor@usatoday.com>, <letters@guardian.co.uk>,
<letters@observer.co.uk>, <mailbox@mirror.co.uk>,
<letters@the-sun.co.uk>, <letters@thetimes.co.uk>,
<letters@independent.co.uk>, <letters@thetimes.co.uk>
cc: tips@infowars.com
Subject: Downingstreet Memo : Director of SIS (aka MI6) - Sir Richard Dearlove
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0506140210090.28435-100000@hubble.stokkie.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Status: RO
X-Status:
X-Keywords:
Dear Editors,
After viewing the c-span broadcast again on May 29, 2005, featuring
Steve Cobble from AfterDowningStreet.org and Kevin Aylward
from wizbangblog.com, i want to address the importance of the
so-called Downing-street memo from 23 July 2002 as was published
on Times-online :
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607_1,00.html
on May 01, 2005.
The most quoted phrase was of course :
"But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."
The full quote of that paragraph :
"C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible
shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush
wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the
conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were
being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN
route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's
record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath
after military action."
Now it might be interesting to know who was "C" in this quote. From
other sources it can be revealed that the following is known about
"C" in the context of the Downing-street memo :
http://www.downingstreetmemo.com/memo.html :
Director of SIS (aka MI6) - Sir Richard Dearlove, is identified as 'C' in
the meeting minutes, heads the UK's foreign intelligence service.
From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Dearlove and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Scarlet we can conclude that
Sir Richard Dearlove's career has not really been going well since
May 6, 2004 as then he was sacked [1] as MI6 (SIS) Director. In fact he
was entirely kicked from the intelligence community since.
On 1 August 2004 he became Master of Pembroke College, Cambridge.
His successor John Scarlett as MI6 (SIS) Director, at the time of the
writing of the memo, Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) ,
was appointed to this position (JIC) 3 days before the 9-11 attack.
What to conclude from this? The good guy, Sir Richard Dearlove was
taken down from the intelligence community, and the bad guy, John
Scarlett was rewarded for his controversial work as Chair of the JIC in
close cooperation with Alastair Campbell on the dossier which would
form the center of the Dr. David Kelly affair.
Do we see a pattern here? People who speak up against the Bush/Blair
WMD fraud get removed. The higher their ranking or their proven
credibility on expert witness information, the more severe these
Governmental removal procedures become. And all of this without regard
to their legal of professional position or status.
Dr. David Kelly apparently committed suicide. Thats the official white
washed story. People who inform themselves, today know better.
Sir Richard Dearlove was, just like has happened to most respected and
experienced intelligence officers inside the CIA , purged from the
Intelligence community. Why ? Because they spoke up to the Bush/Blair WMD
fraud.
Today the majority of the American and United Kingdom citizens have
serious doubts about the Bush/Blair invasion of Iraq based on the WMD
fraud.
Today numerous officers and experts both from inside MI6 as from the
CIA and other less known intelligence institutions have spoken up to
the Bush/Blair WMD fraud. But they _ALL_ got removed, without regards
to their previous proven track records, congress medals, or Sir titles
awarded by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth of the United Kingdom.
This has got to stop.
I demand the immediate and simultaneous impeachment of both President
George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair for conspiring a invasion
into Iraq based on intentional fixed and forged intelligence documents.
The two gentlemen can choose to leave immediately or might risk a court
marshal for committing war crimes.
Yours Sincerely,
Robert M. Stockmann
--
Robert M. Stockmann - RHCE
Network Engineer - UNIX/Linux Specialist
crashrecovery.org stock@stokkie.net
[1] MI6 chief to quit after split on Iraq
Memo: Bush manipulated Iraq intelNATION (copied from www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-uswmd074251820may09,0,7225183.story)
Memo: Bush manipulated Iraq intel
Knight Ridder Newspapers
May 9, 2005
WASHINGTON - A highly classified British memo, leaked in the midst of
Britain's just-concluded election campaign, indicates that President
George W. Bush decided to overthrow Iraqi President Saddam Hussein by
summer 2002 and was determined to ensure that U.S. intelligence data
supported his policy.
The document, which summarizes a July 23, 2002, meeting of British
Prime Minister Tony Blair with his top security advisers, reports on a
visit to Washington by the head of Britain's MI-6 intelligence service.
The visit took place while the Bush administration was still declaring
to the American public that no decision had been made to go to war.
"There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now
seen as inevitable," the MI-6 chief said at the meeting, according to
the memo. "Bush wanted to remove Saddam through military action,
justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD," or weapons of mass
destruction.
The memo said, "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy." No weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq since
the U.S. invasion in March 2003.
The White House has repeatedly denied accusations made by several top
foreign officials that it manipulated intelligence estimates to justify
an invasion of Iraq.
It has instead pointed to the conclusions of two studies, one by the
Senate Intelligence Committee and one by a presidentially appointed
panel, that cite serious failures by the CIA and other agencies in
judging Hussein's weapons programs.
The principal U.S. intelligence analysis, called a National
Intelligence Estimate, wasn't completed until October 2002, well after
the United States and United Kingdom had apparently decided military
force should be used to overthrow Hussein's regime.
The newly disclosed memo, which was first reported by the Sunday Times
of London, hasn't been disavowed by the British government. The British
Embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for comment.
A former senior U.S. official called it "an absolutely accurate
description of what transpired" during the senior British intelligence
officer's visit to Washington. He spoke on condition of anonymity.
A White House official said the administration wouldn't comment on
leaked British documents.
In July 2002, and well afterward, top Bush administration foreign
policy advisers were insisting that "there are no plans to attack Iraq
on the president's desk." But the memo quotes British Foreign Secretary
Jack Straw, a close colleague of then-Secretary of State Colin Powell,
as saying that "Bush had made up his mind to take military action."
Straw is quoted as having his doubts about the Iraqi threat.
"But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and
his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran,"
the memo reported he said.
Straw reportedly proposed that Hussein be given an ultimatum to
re-admit United Nations weapons inspectors, which could help justify
the eventual use of force.
Powell in August 2002 persuaded Bush to make the case against Hussein
at the United Nations and to push for renewed weapons inspections.
But there were deep divisions within the White House over that course
of action. The British document says that the National Security
Council, then led by Condoleezza Rice, "had no patience with the UN
route."
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Copyright 2005 Newsday Inc.
Bush asked to explain UK war memo
Thursday, May 12, 2005 Posted: 2:49 AM EDT (0649 GMT) (copied from http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/05/11/britain.war.memo/) WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Eighty-nine Democratic members of the U.S. Congress last week sent President George W. Bush a letter asking for explanation of a secret British memo that said "intelligence and facts were being fixed" to support the Iraq war in mid-2002. The timing of the memo was well before the president brought the issue to Congress for approval. The Times of London newspaper published the memo -- actually minutes of a highlevel meeting on Iraq held July 23, 2002 -- on May 1 British officials did not dispute the document's authenticity, and Michael Boyce, then Britain's Chief of Defense Staff, told the paper that Britain had not then made a decision to follow the United States to war, but it would have been "irresponsible" not to prepare for the possibility. The Whitehouse has not yet responded to queries about the congressional letter, which was released on May 6. The letter, initiated by Rep. John Conyers, ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee, said the memo "raises troubling new questions regarding the legal justifications for the war as well as the integrity of your own administration..." "While various individuals have asserted this to be the case before, including Paul O'Neill, former U.S. Treasury Secretary, and Richard Clarke, a former National Security Council official, they have been previously dismissed by your administration," the letter said. But, the letter said, when the document was leaked Prime Minister Tony Blair's spokesman called it "nothing new." In addition to Blair, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon, Attorney General Peter Goldsmith, MI6 chief Richard Dearlove and others attended the meeting. A British official identified as "C" said that he had returned from a meeting in Washington and that "military action was now seen as inevitable" by U.S. officials. "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. "The NSC had no patience with the U.N. route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action." The memo further discussed the military options under consideration by the United States, along with Britain's possible role. It quoted Hoon as saying the United States had not finalized a timeline, but that it would likely begin "30 days before the U.S. congressional elections," culminating with the actual attack in January 2003. "It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided," the memo said. "But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran." The British officials determined to push for an ultimatum for Saddam to allow U.N. weapons inspectors back into Iraq to "help with the legal justification for the use of force ... despite U.S. resistance." Britain's attorney general, Peter Goldsmith, advised the group that "the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action" and two of three possible legal bases -- self-defense and humanitarian intervention -- could not be used. The third was a U.N. Security Council resolution, which Goldsmith said "would be difficult." Blair thought that "it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the U.N. inspectors." "If the political context were right, people would support regime change," the memo said. Later, the memo said, Blair would work to convince Bush that they should pursue the ultimatum with Saddam even though "many in the U.S. did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route." Indignation Grows in U.S. Over British Prewar DocumentsPublished on Thursday, May 12, 2005 by the Los Angeles Times (copied from http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0512-01.htm) Indignation Grows in U.S. Over British Prewar Documents Critics of Bush call them proof that he and Blair never saw diplomacy as an option with Hussein.
by John Daniszewski
LONDON - Reports in the British press this month based on documents
indicating that President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair had
conditionally agreed by July 2002 to invade Iraq appear to have blown
over quickly in Britain.
But in the United States, where the reports at first received scant
attention, there has been growing indignation among critics of the Bush
White House, who say the documents help prove that the leaders made a
secret decision to oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein nearly a year
before launching their attack, shaped intelligence to that aim and
never seriously intended to avert the war through diplomacy.
The documents, obtained by Michael Smith, a defense specialist writing
for the Sunday Times of London, include a memo of the minutes of a
meeting July 23, 2002, between Blair and his intelligence and military
chiefs; a briefing paper for that meeting and a Foreign Office legal
opinion prepared before an April 2002 summit between Blair and Bush in
Texas.
The picture that emerges from the documents is of a British government
convinced of the U.S. desire to go to war and Blair's agreement to it,
subject to several specific conditions.
Since Smith's report was published May 1, Blair's Downing Street office
has not disputed the documents' authenticity. Asked about them
Wednesday, a Blair spokesman said the report added nothing significant
to the much-investigated record of the lead-up to the war.
"At the end of the day, nobody pushed the diplomatic route harder than
the British government&. So the circumstances of this July discussion
very quickly became out of date," said the spokesman, who asked not to
be identified.
The leaked minutes sum up the July 23 meeting, at which Blair, top
security advisors and his attorney general discussed Britain's role in
Washington's plan to oust Hussein. The minutes, written by Matthew
Rycroft, a foreign policy aide, indicate general thoughts among the
participants about how to create a political and legal basis for war.
The case for military action at the time was "thin," Foreign Minister
Jack Straw was characterized as saying, and Hussein's government posed
little threat.
Labeled "secret and strictly personal U.K. eyes only," the minutes
begin with the head of the British intelligence service, MI6, who is
identified as "C," saying he had returned from Washington, where there
had been a "perceptible shift in attitude. Bush wanted to remove
Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of
terrorism and [weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and
the facts were being fixed around the policy."
Straw agreed that Bush seemed determined to act militarily, although
the timing was not certain.
"But the case was thin," the minutes say. "Saddam was not threatening
his neighbors, and his WMD capacity was less than that of Libya, North
Korea or Iran."
Straw then proposed to "work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam" to
permit United Nations weapons inspectors back into Iraq. "This would
also help with the legal justification for the use of force," he said,
according to the minutes.
Blair said, according to the memo, "that it would make a big difference
politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the U.N.
inspectors."
"If the political context were right, people would support regime
change," Blair said. "The two key issues were whether the military plan
worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military
plan the space to work."
In addition to the minutes, the Sunday Times report referred to a
Cabinet briefing paper that was given to participants before the July
23 meeting. It stated that Blair had already promised Bush cooperation
earlier, at the April summit in Texas.
"The U.K. would support military action to bring about regime change,"
the Sunday Times quoted the briefing as saying.
Excerpts from the paper, which Smith provided to the Los Angeles Times,
said Blair had listed conditions for war, including that "efforts had
been made to construct a coalition/shape public opinion, the
Israel-Palestine crisis was quiescent," and options to "eliminate
Iraq's WMD through the U.N. weapons inspectors" had been exhausted.
The briefing paper said the British government should get the U.S. to
put its military plans in a "political framework."
"This is particularly important for the U.K. because it is necessary to
create the conditions in which we could legally support military
action," it says.
In a letter to Bush last week, 89 House Democrats expressed shock over
the documents. They asked if the papers were authentic and, if so,
whether they proved that the White House had agreed to invade Iraq
months before seeking Congress' OK.
"If the disclosure is accurate, it raises troubling new questions
regarding the legal justifications for the war as well as the integrity
of our own administration," the letter says.
"While the president of the United States was telling the citizens and
the Congress that they had no intention to start a war with Iraq, they
were working very close with Tony Blair and the British leadership at
making this a foregone conclusion," the letter's chief author, Rep.
John Conyers Jr. of Michigan, said Wednesday.
If the documents are real, he said, it is "a huge problem" in terms of
an abuse of power. He said the White House had not yet responded to the
letter.
Both Blair and Bush have denied that a decision on war was made in
early 2002. The White House and Downing Street maintain that they were
preparing for military operations as an option, but that the option to
not attack also remained open until the war began March 20, 2003.
In January 2002, Bush described Iraq as a member of an "axis of evil,"
but the sustained White House push for Iraqi compliance with U.N.
resolutions did not come until September of that year. That month, Bush
addressed the U.N. General Assembly to outline a case against Hussein's
government, and he sought a bipartisan congressional resolution
authorizing the possible use of force.
In November 2002, the U.N. Security Council approved a resolution
demanding that Iraq readmit weapons inspectors.
An effort to pass a second resolution expressly authorizing the use of
force against Iraq did not succeed.
Times staff writer Paul Richter in Washington contributed to this report.
© Copyright 2005 Los Angeles Times
###
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"HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL." Last edited on Mon, Nov 10, 2008 Contents :
The Curse of Canaan, A Demonology of History Last edited on Sat, Nov 08, 2008 Contents :
"The Illuminati and the Counsel on Foreign Relations Conspiracy" Last edited on Fri, Nov 07, 2008 Contents :
"911 was a Mossad Operation" Last edited on Thu, Nov 06, 2008 Contents :
"Russian Israeli duel for power, oil and dirty cash" Last edited on Thu, Nov 06, 2008 Contents :
"HITLER was a BRITISH AGENT" Last edited on Thu, Nov 06, 2008 Contents :
"Benjamin Freedman warns America" Last edited on Thu, Nov 06, 2008 Contents :
"A pre Jesuit history" Last edited on Sun, Nov 02, 2008 Contents :
EU Software Patent Directive Last edited on Fri, Oct 17, 2008 Contents :
"Report from IRON MOUNTAIN" Last edited on Mon, Sep 29, 2008 Contents :
"Dark Matter, a result of the heliocentric doctrine" Last edited on Wed, Sep 10, 2008 Contents :
"Susan Lindauer -- Reporter Held Political Prisoner" Last edited on Sun, Aug 03, 2008 In March 2001 Susan Lindauer carried a message from
the Iraqi government to her cousin, the White House Chief of Staff,
requesting the return of weapons inspectors. But Bush nevertheless
attacked and invaded Iraq using WMD as a pretext, murdered as many as
500,000 people, and spread radioactive poison over the entire country,
which will murder millions more.
Susan Lindauer was for over period of almost a year in prison on false
claims of insanity, sentenced on Feb 15, 2006 by then U.S. District
Judge Michael Mukasey. On Sept. 8, 2006 the forced mental
hospitalization was however dropped by Mukasey, and she was
subsequently released. A most weird case as the hearings carousel is
continuing to this very day.
"To Eliminate the Opiate" Last edited on Sat, Jul 12, 2008 Contents :
"The History of Mind Control" Last edited on Sat, Jul 12, 2008 Contents :
The secret Downing Street memo Last edited on Sat, Jun 21, 2008 Contents :
MOSSAD's control over the Internet Last edited on Thu, Jun 19, 2008 Contents :
"Satanic Voices, Ancient & Modern" Last edited on Tue, Jan 01, 2008 Contents :
"Testimonials of Illuminati and Zionist
influence in Present Day America" Last edited on Sun, Dec 23, 2007 Norman Dodd, Paul Findley and Alan Hart present
their findings of facts which have directed America towards a highly
controversial direction, where as the late Norman Dodd stated : "Since
World War one, the men who lead this country, have institutionalized
conflicting interests to such an extend that they can never be
resolved. The Tax-Exempt foundations like the Cargenie Endowment, The
Ford and Rockerfeller foundation have been instrumental in this"
"The NWO : a Tarnung by Teutonic Knights?" Last edited on Fri, Nov 16, 2007 The Vatican Church has supported the Nazi's in the
1930's 40's and 50's. This connection turns out to be a very old one,
as middle eave Popes were emanating the agenda and mindset for the
crusades. This Nazi connection actually turns out to be a Teutonic
connection.
"Fr. Leonard Feeney M.I.C.M." Last edited on Thu, Nov 15, 2007 A catholic Jesuit priest published a number of
articles in the 1950s illustrating numerous efforts by governmental
sponsored groups to systematic abolish the Catholic Religion and
religious faith in general.
"The protocols are for real" Last edited on Mon, Nov 12, 2007 Barry Chamish, a political writer from Israel has
connected some dots regarding "the protocols of the learned elders of
Zion" which seem not to be the playbook of the Jewish people, but turn
out to be a masterplan designed by the Illuminati to take over the
world. A masterplan which denounces all wellbeing and prospering of
normal people.
Louis Madelin, "La Revolution" Last edited on Thu, Nov 01, 2007 a analysis about the French Revolution, still to be
completed and translated.
"U.S. Patent No. 4,686,605 : H.A.A.R.P." Last edited on Thu, Nov 01, 2007 A illustration of how H.A.A.R.P works in practice,
based on a U.S. Patent document.
King James Reference Bible Last edited on Thu, Mar 08, 2007 A lot of content concerning the NWO is somehow
related to the Bible. As a convenience i present a restaurated
copy of http://www.htmlbible.com/ which recently somehow disappeared
from the internet. To verify the md5sum checksum and file sizes, load the same url, with https. So when you have http://crashrecovery.org/moneymasters/ inside your browser, reload the same url with https://crashrecovery.org/moneymasters/ in a new window or tab and save the new loaded page as a file, i.e. internet.html. The md5 checksum and file size of internet.html should be the same as internet/index.html as listed above. Note that the "Save Page As..." option in many modern browserslike e.g. Mozilla Firefox produces bad md5 checksums. Somehow some extra garbage html is added. In such cases one should use wget and md5sum. For the Microsoft Windows platform see wget and md5sums. Wget version 1.10 on Windows is currently a mess when using https, so get version 1.9.1. I recommend to download ftp://ftp.sunsite.dk/projects/wget/windows/wget-1.9.1b.zip , ftp://ftp.sunsite.dk/projects/wget/windows/ssllibs097c.zip and http://www.pc-tools.net/files/win32/freeware/md5sums-1.2.zip Unzip the contents of these three zipfiles into a directory (Folder) and proceed as follows from the windows command shell cmd.exe :
which corresponds with :
-rw-r--r-- 3 crashrec klant 95659 Apr 15 07:55 moneymasters/index.html
Robert M. Stockmann
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